The entire text of the Appointments Clause is brief, leaving case law to fill in the blanks. To date, virtually every court and commentator begins their analysis by conceding that the case law, and hence, the doctrine of the Appointments Clause is unclear. Unfortunately, this lack of clarity has resulted in a sort of constitutional Rorschach test for who is an Officer, giving some comfort to both sides in nearly every case. The usual mode for deciding an Appointments Clause case was comparative-courts would analogize the position at issue to similar positions in other cases.
11 No more. This Article submits that subsequent to the seminal Tucker decisions, the black letter law for distinguishing between Officer and employee is close to fully developed.
This Article is the first to comprehensively outline the post-Tucker doctrine of the Appointments Clause. Consequently, it is the first to state the post-Tucker definition of Officer. Under Tucker I, an Officer under the Appointments Clause holds a position that is (1) "established by Law," (2) "continuing," and (3) vested with "significant authority."
12 Under Tucker II, "significant authority" consists of (1) power over "significant" or important matters, (2) "discretion," and (3) "final" decision-making authority. 13 Looking back to the opening hypothetical, we intuit that a law clerk is a lesser functionary or mere employee, 14 and from case law, we know the status of special trial judges, 15 administrative law judges (ALJs) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 16 and IRS appeals
In Part II, this Article will describe the meaning and purpose of the Appointments Clause. In Part III, this Article will briefly outline the early precedent and the seminal case of Buckley v. Valeo. 22 Lastly, Part IV explains the Tucker decisions 23 in light of the Constitution, previous precedent, and status quo bias. It also delineates the current definition of Officer.
II. MEANING AND PURPOSE OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE

A. Meaning of the Appointments Clause
The text of the Appointments Clause is set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution and provides for the appointment of "Officers of the United States": [ The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Four Modes of Selection under the Appointments Clause
The Appointments Clause requires all "Officers" to be appointed by one of four modes: (1) by the President with Senate confirmation, (2) by the President alone, (3) by the Courts of Law, and (4) by the Heads of Departments. 25 Although the first two modes require little or no explanation, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has held that the term "Courts of Law" is not limited to Article III courts and includes Article I legislative courts such as the U.S. Tax Court. 26 It should also be noted that a Department is defined as a "'free-standing, self-contained entity in the Executive Branch,'" such as the Department of the Treasury. 27 It refers to "executive divisions like the Cabinet-level departments . . . ." 28 "Accordingly, the term 'Heads of Departments' does not embrace 'inferior commissioners and bureau officers'" who head up sub-departments and agencies within Departments such as the IRS. 29 Therefore, the Secretary of the Treasury is a Department Head who may constitutionally appoint "inferior Officers" with statutory permission, whereas the Commissioner of the IRS is not. 24 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 25 Id. 26 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 888-92 ("an Article I court, which exercises judicial power, can be a 'Court of Law' within the meaning of the Appointments Clause"). 27 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 915 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 28 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886. The Appointments Clause distinguishes between Officers, who must be appointed, and mere employees, who may be hired by anyone in any manner. This is an implicit distinction, because the Appointments Clause never utilizes the term "employee," let alone juxtaposes that term against an Officer. However, the Supreme Court has held that the term Officer "does not include all employees of the United States . . . ." 30 Furthermore, it has defined the term "employee" to mean "lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States." 31 Lastly, the Tax Court has recently held that "the Appointments Clause governs appointment of individual persons," not groups. 32 The appropriate inquiry is whether a single position possesses the necessary characteristics of an Office, not whether several positions might collectively constitute an Office. 33 
Id.
34 "The term 'principal officer' is not in the Appointments Clause but is borrowed from the immediately preceding clause (i.e., U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1), which provides that 'The President * * * may require the Opinion in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.'" Tucker, 135 T.C. at 122. 35 In the so-called "Excepting Clause," the Appointments Clause provides that "the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in The line between 'inferior' and 'principal' officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should be drawn." 37 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the distinction between inferior and principal Officers is not so much about their rank or responsibility, but whether the Officer in question has a superior. 38 An Officer who answers directly to the President is a "principal Officer," whereas an Officer who answers to yet another Officer is an "inferior Officer."
39 One significant factor in determining whether one Officer is answerable to another is whether that Officer may be removed by the other at will and without cause.
40
B. Purpose of the Appointments Clause
he Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of 'etiquette or protocol'; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme."
41 Specifically, the Founders authored the Appointments Clause as a safeguard for the separation of powers. 42 To that end, " [t] he Appointments Clause has four related but distinct purposes." 43 510). However, "that convenience was deemed to outweigh the benefits of the more cumbersome procedure [of appointment by the President with Senate confirmation] only with respect to the appointment of 'inferior Officers.'" Id. 36 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Tucker, 135 T.C. at 125-26 ("while the Appointments Clause does allow an exception for inferior officers to be appointed by the President alone or by the Secretary, the terms of that exception are that 'Congress may by Law vest the Appointment' in the President alone or the Head of a Department. Where Congress has not made any such exception 'by Law,' then the default rule applies."). 37 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988). 38 Id. 39 
Id.
40 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162 ("In particular, we noted that '[t]he power to remove officers' at will and without cause 'is a powerful tool for control' of an inferior." (quoting Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665)). 41 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659. 42 The Supreme Court has stated "that we must examine the language of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2" in the context of separation of the powers. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124-25. It has also acknowledged that "[t]he
Prevent One Branch From Creating and Filling the Same Office
First and foremost, the Appointments Clause was intended to guard against one branch of government both creating and filling the same government office. 44 This concern arose in direct response to the colonial practice of King George III, who "erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people and eat out their substance." 45 At the time, this practice of creating and filling the same government office was considered "the most insidious and powerful weapon of eighteenth century despotism." 46 Under the Appointments Clause, no one branch of government is king. 47 Generally, the legislative branch creates the position of Officer, and the executive or judicial branch must fill it. 48 
Prevent Diffusion of the Appointment Power
The Appointments Clause guards against "the diffusion of the appointment power" in the executive branch by prohibiting Congress from granting that power to lower-level officials. 49 Only the President, or one appointed by the President, may appoint an "Officer."
50 Stated otherwise, the Appointments Clause allows "only one degree of separation between any duly appointed officer and the President, thus maintaining the locus of executive power in the President himself." 51 roots of the separation-of-powers concept embedded in the Appointments Clause are structural and political." Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878. 43 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 120. 44 Id. 45 48 See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659 ("By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches."). 49 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 120-21. 50 Id. 51 Id.
Political Accountability
By preventing "diffusion," the Founders also endeavored to ensure political accountability. 52 By guaranteeing only one degree of separation between the President and her Officers, the President cannot avoid responsibility for the actions of her Officers. 53 As Alexander Hamilton noted, "The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and absolutely." 54 In addition, as James Madison noted, by maintaining a proximity between the President and her Officers, even unelected appointees are "the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves." By vesting the bulk of the appointment power in the President rather than Congress, the Founders hoped to "assure a higher quality of appointments." 56 Specifically, they hoped "that the President would be less vulnerable to interest-group pressure and personal favoritism than would a collective body. 'The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more exact regard to reputation.'" 57
III. APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The law of the Appointments Clause derives first from Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, and second from a long line of Supreme Court precedent that authoritatively interprets the Clause. However, in recent years, an opinion authored by the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice (the "OLC") has been cited with increasing frequency by scholars and the federal courts, including the 52 Id. at 121. 53 
Id.
54 THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton).
55 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 56 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton)). 57 Id. 
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A. Definition of Officer Under Early Case Law
In several of the earliest cases, the courts used "circular logic" to define the constitutional term of Officer.
63 Namely, if a position was filled pursuant to the Appointments Clause, then the courts held that the position is an Office and must be appointed. 64 conveniently enough, the position is not an Office. 65 However, even in the primordial days of the nation's founding, there was a rough consensus that a position is an Office if its holder is "delegated sovereign authority." 66 English common law and colonial era law dictionaries agreed that any person "charged" or "delegated" the sovereign authority of the government to intervene in others' affairs without their consent is an Officer. 67 The OLC Memo posits that this early conception of sovereign authority is the forerunner of "significant authority" We think that the term "Officers of the United States" as used in Art. II, defined to include "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government" in United States v. Germaine, supra, is a term intended to have substantive meaning. We think its fair import is that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an "Officer of the United States," and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article. 73 The Secretary of the U.S. Senate and the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives were to serve as nonvoting, ex-officio members. 74 The other six appointees were full voting members, two of which were appointed by the President, two by the President pro tempore of the Senate, and two by the Speaker of the House. 75 The appointments of all six voting members were subject to confirmation by both the Senate and House. 76 Since none of the voting members were selected pursuant to the Appointments Clause, the Supreme Court held that none of them may constitutionally exercise significant authority.
77
The Supreme Court then reviewed the powers of the voting members and sorted them into three categories: (1) investigative and informative powers-"functions relating to the flow of necessary information-receipt, dissemination, and investigation"; (2) interpretive and rulemaking powers-"functions with respect to the Commission's task of fleshing out the statute-rulemaking and advisory opinions"; and (3) enforcement powers-"functions necessary to ensure compliance with the statute and rules-informal procedures, administrative determinations and hearings, and civil suits." 78 The Supreme Court held "there can be no question that" Congress could delegate the "investigative and informative" powers to the unappointed voting members, because it could delegate those same powers to its own committees. 79 However, it reached a different conclusion in 74 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113. 75 Id. 76 
Id.
77 Even the two voting members appointed by the President were not selected pursuant to the Appointments Clause because their appointment was subject to confirmation by both the Senate and House. Under the Clause, Presidential appointments must be made by the President alone or by the President with confirmation by the Senate alone, not by the Senate and the House. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 78 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137. 79 Id. considering "the more substantial powers" of the voting members. 80 The Supreme Court held that only an Officer could exercise the interpretive and rulemaking powers because they were exercised "free from day to day supervision," and thus, constituted "a significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a public law." 81 The Supreme Court also held that only an Officer could exercise the enforcement powers because they belonged to the executive branch.
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In short, we can distill the following legal principles from Buckley v. Valeo. First, Buckley coined the term "significant authority" and established the principle that only Officers may constitutionally wield such authority. 83 Second, purely investigative and informative powers do not constitute significant authority. 84 Third, "significant" interpretive and rulemaking powers, such as the power to issue regulations or make determinations without supervision, or "significant" enforcement powers, such as the power to bring suit to enforce a federal statute, constitute "significant authority."
85 Fourth, one factor in determining whether authority is "significant" in nature is whether such authority is exercised "free from day-to-day supervision." 86 This last principle was reaffirmed by Freytag, in which the Supreme Court cited to the "independent authority" of special trial judges to make final decisions in holding them to be Officers. 
C. The "Duffy Defect"
The so-called "Duffy Defect" is named for Professor John F. Duffy 88 and refers to Appointments Clause violations. 89 Although the Appointments Clause is as old as the Constitution itself, Professor Duffy's work sparked a renewed interest in the Clause. In particular, his famous assertion that administrative patent judges are Officers not only changed the manner in which those judges are appointed, but sparked a flurry of articles and lawsuits with respect to other positions. As a result, scholars and commentators often refer to an Appointments Clause or "triple 2" violation as the "Duffy Defect."
To use the popular term in a sentence, the failure to properly appoint an Officer in accordance with the special procedures of the Appointments Clause is a "Duffy Defect" in that appointment. As the Supreme Court concluded in Buckley v. Valeo, only properly appointed Officers may constitutionally wield "significant authority." 90 The decisions of a defectively appointed Officer are presumptively invalid and subject to collateral attack. As a result, the discovery of a potential "Duffy Defect" has significant and practical consequences. Specifically, he alleged that IRS hearing officers wield "significant authority" without appointment by a Department Head.
104
D. Recent Scholarship on Tucker and the Appointments Clause
Recent scholarship on the constitutional line between Officers and employees typically cites back to the "Duffy Defect" as its source and inspiration. 105 In general, it disagrees with the outcome of the Tucker decisions, which hold that IRS hearing officers are mere employees. 106 In his briefs and concurrent publications, Professor Smith argued that IRS hearing officers are Officers under the Appointments Clause because they are most analogous to the Tax Court special trial judges who were held to be Officers in Freytag.
Professor Stacey Lindstedt
107 authored the most recent law review article in this area-after Tucker I was decided but prior to Tucker II. 108 102 Id. 103 Id. ("A New York Times article about the defect in the appointment of the patent and trademark judges by a person who was not the Head of a Department was the trigger that got petitioner's counsel thinking about whether CDP hearing officer needed to be appointed."). 104 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 117. 105 Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 1144 ("a series of articles followed 'The Duffy Defect,' questioning the applicability of the Appointments Clause to a range of government actors, from Bankruptcy Judges to the Pay Czar") (citing Harold C. Where the Tax Court held that the positions of IRS hearing officers are not "established by Law" or vested with "significant authority," Professor Lindstedt concludes the opposite. 110 First, Professor Lindstedt argues that "established by Law" is best read as meaning "set forth by some legal authority," not created by statute or even regulation.
111 Since the position of IRS hearing officer is lawfully created by IRS practice and procedure, 112 she concludes it is "established by Law."
113 Second, Professor Lindstedt argues that "final decision-making authority" is unnecessary for "significant authority," and that the definition of finality as the "last word" in an agency is too narrow. 114 Instead, "a better test of finality" is "an action which is necessary and sufficient for judicial review."
115 Since some decisions of IRS hearing officers trigger judicial review, she finds that they possess final decision-making authority, and thus, significant authority.
116 As a result, Professor Lindstedt concludes that IRS hearing officers are indeed Officers under the Appointments Clause.
117
In addition to her technical, legal critique of Tucker I, Professor Lindstedt also attacks the decision for undermining the purposes of the Appointments Clause-namely, political accountability and separation of powers.
118 This Article agrees with Professor Lindstedt, and the OLC Memo to which she cites, that any lawful Office, including that of IRS 109 Id. at 1177-86. 110 Id. 113 Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 1177-84. 114 Id. at 1178-79. 115 Id.
116 Id. at 1183-85. 117 Id. at 1185. 119 However, this Article respectfully disagrees with Professor Lindstedt and Professor Smith on the ultimate issue. IRS hearing officers lack significant authority and are not Officers. In fact, holding otherwise would undermine the purposes of the Appointments Clause. If low-level bureaucrats must be appointed like judges, then the scrutiny and standards for all appointments will fall. As a result, the outcome of the Tucker decisions is not only legally, but normatively correct.
IV. THE POST-TUCKER DEFINITION OF OFFICER
This Article is the first scholarly attempt to outline the post-Tucker doctrine of the Appointments Clause. As a result, it is the first to state the post-Tucker definition of "Officer."
A. The Tucker Decisions
In Tucker I, the Tax Court defines an Officer under the Appointments Clause as one who holds a position that is (1) "established by Law," (2) "continuing," and (3) vested with "significant authority." In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit identifies three "main criteria" for determining when a position is vested with "significant authority": (1) power over "significant" or important matters, (2) "discretion," and (3) "final" decision-making authority.
No modern cases state that significant authority is possible without significance or discretion. 120 However, some dicta suggest that final decision-making authority is not always necessary for a finding of significant authority. Although Tucker II is silent on the question of whether each of these "main criteria" are necessary to find "significant authority," whenever a court holds that one of the three "main criteria" is absent, it also holds that "significant authority" is absent. Notwithstanding dicta to the contrary, 121 or the possibility of an extreme case, this Article submits that each of the "main criteria" is a necessary element of significant authority in all or most cases.
Tucker I: Clarifying Modern Appointments Clause Jurisprudence in
Defining an "Officer"
a. Facts
As with so many modern Greek tragedies, the tale of Larry Tucker begins with student loans and a bad economy. 122 Mr. Tucker was a paralegal in the mid-1990s. 123 He personally witnessed the rise of the internet and wanted to ride its proverbial wave, so he enrolled at New York University for an advanced degree in information technology. 121 In Freytag, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that significant enough "duties and discretion" might outweigh a "lack of authority to enter a final decision." However, the Supreme Court did not decide the issue, because it found that special trial judges possess final decision-making authority. 501 U.S. at 881. 122 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 117-19; Smith, supra note 8, at 777. 123 Smith, supra note 8, at 777. 124 Id. 125 Id. 126 Id. 127 Id. 129 In response, Mr. Tucker requested a collection due process (CDP) hearing, which was held as a telephone conference between himself, his counsel, and an IRS settlement officer. 130 After some correspondence, Mr. Tucker sent a Form 656, "Offer in Compromise" (OIC), to the IRS which proposed to settle approximately $39,000 of his liabilities for $36,772 in 116 monthly installments of $317. 131 The settlement officer rejected the OIC and her decision was approved by her appeals team manager, a position tasked with overseeing CDP hearings. 132 In response, Mr. Tucker filed his petition in U.S. Tax Court. The case was remanded to the Office of Appeals for further consideration, and once again, Mr. Tucker's OIC was rejected by a second settlement officer. 133 That rejection was approved by the same appeals team manager. 134 The case then returned to the Tax Court, where Mr. Tucker argued that (1) the IRS abused its discretion in rejecting his OIC and (2) the denizens of the Office of Appeals who presided over his CDP hearing were unconstitutionally appointed Officers of the United States. 135 
b. Abuse of Discretion
The Tax Court quickly dispensed with Mr. Tucker's argument that the IRS abused its discretion in rejecting his OIC on two grounds. 136 First, the IRS was justified in rejecting the OIC because Mr. Tucker wrongfully dissipated thousands of dollars through day trading. 137 Second, dissipation aside, there was a reasonable basis for the settlement officer's 129 Smith, supra note 8. 130 Id. 131 Id. 132 Id. 133 Id. 134 Id. 135 Id. 136 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 157. 137 
Id.
Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2014.26 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu determination. 138 Of greater interest was the Tax Court's nearly 90-page opinion addressing Mr. Tucker's constitutional argument that settlement officers and appeals officers who hear CDP cases, as well as the appeals team managers who supervise them, wield the significant authority of an Officer and must be installed pursuant to the Appointments Clause. 139 
c. Definition of Officer
The constitutional question squarely in front of the Tax Court was the status of the settlement officers, appeals officers, and appeals team managers under the Appointments Clause. To determine if these positions are that of Officers or employees, the court drew directly on the text of the Appointments Clause and Supreme Court precedent to articulate a threepart test. Namely, an Officer under the Appointments Clause holds a position that is (1) "established by Law," (2) "continuing," and (3) vested with "significant authority."
140
In Tucker I, the IRS conceded that the positions at issue were "continuing."
141 However, the Tax Court held that the positions were not "established by Law" or vested with "significant authority."
142 As a result of failing two of the three prongs of the test, the Tax Court held that IRS hearing officers are mere employees. 
i. Established by Law
A position must be "established by Law" in order to constitute an Office. 144 This Article submits that any lawful Office is "established by Law" irrespective of whether such Office is created by statute or regulation.
The requirement that an Office is "established by Law" is derived directly from the text of the Appointments Clause, which provides that Offices "shall be established by Law."
145 Courts and commentators alike have debated the meaning of this phrase and at least three schools of thought have developed. The most stringent view is that a position is "established by Law" if and only if Congress adopts a statute which creates the position. 146 Another somewhat more forgiving view is that a position is also "established by Law" if a valid regulation creates it. 147 The most expansive viewpoint is that any lawful position, that is, any position "set forth by some legal authority," is "established by Law. 161 Early precedent also reinforces the understanding that a position must have some duration or ongoing duties to constitute an Office. 162 As far back as George Washington, our Presidents have appointed temporary diplomats without nominating them to the Senate. 163 "In a striking early illustration, President Jefferson appointed Senator Daniel Smith as a commissioner to negotiate and execute treaties with the Cherokee Indians, yet Jefferson did not submit the nomination to the Senate, and Smith did not vacate his seat in the Senate." 164 Given that none of the Founders or their contemporaries objected to this early and pervasive practice, it stands to reason that it was considered constitutional. 165 From a survey of the historical record, the OLC Memo concludes that the rationale for appointing temporary diplomats without following the procedures of the Appointments Clause was that those positions were not "continuing," and hence, were not Offices.
166
In a trio of cases decided after the Civil War, the Supreme Court articulated, and twice reiterated verbatim, the current black letter law of the "continuing" requirement. 167 In United States v. Hartwell, the first case of 161 Officers of the U.S., 2007 OLC LEXIS 3* at *74-75. 162 Id. at *77-78. 163 Id. at *79. 164 Id. at *23 (citing 1 Am. St. Papers, Indian Affairs 697-98 (1805)). As noted above, absent specific statutory authorization, the President alone may not appoint even inferior Officers without confirmation by the Senate. In addition, Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Incompatibility Clause, provides that "no Person holding any Office under the United States shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." In layman's terms, Congressmen and Senators must resign their position to become Officers. The fact that President Jefferson appointed Senator Smith as a commissioner without Senate confirmation, and the fact that the Senator did not resign his seat, both strongly suggest that the position of commissioner was not an Office. This suggestion is reinforced by the fact that President Jefferson was a founding father and that no contemporaneous objections to Senator Smith's appointment are on record.
Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2014.26 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu the trilogy, the Supreme Court concluded that "a clerk in the office of the assistant treasurer of the United States, at Boston," held a "continuing" position because "[h]is duties were continuing and permanent, not occasional or temporary." 168 In United States v. Germaine, the Supreme Court followed Hartwell to conclude that a surgeon appointed by the "Commissioner of Pensions" to examine pensioners or pension claimants on an "on call" basis did not hold a "continuing" position because his "duties are not continuing and permanent, and they are occasional and intermittent." 169 The Supreme Court explained that "[t]he surgeon is only to act when called on by the Commissioner of Pensions in some special case . . . . He may make fifty of these examinations in a year, or none." 170 Lastly, in Auffmordt v. Hedden, the Supreme Court followed both Hartwell and Germaine to conclude that a "merchant appraiser" hired by the Treasury Department for expert reappraisals of merchandise did not hold a continuing position because "[h]is position is without tenure, duration, continuing emolument, or continuous duties, and he acts only occasionally and temporarily."
171 The Supreme Court explained that "[h]e is an executive agent, as an expert assistant to aid in ascertaining the value of the goods, selected for the particular case on the request of the importer, and selected for his special knowledge in regard to the character and value of the particular goods in question." 172 The merchant appraiser "has no claim or right to be designated, or to act except as he may be designated." 173 The doctrine of the "continuing" requirement has not changed significantly since 1890 when Auffmordt was decided. There are a few close cases, like that of independent counsel, where the position is held for an indefinite time period but concludes upon the completion of a discrete 168 Hartwell, 73 U.S. at 392-93. 169 Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511-12. 170 Id. at 512. 171 Auffmordt, 137 U.S. at 326-27. 172 Id. at 327. 173 
Id.
Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2014.26 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu task. 174 However, most cases fall neatly into the category of the clearly "continuing," like the full-time, indefinitely employed special trial judges of the U.S. Tax Court, or the clearly temporary, like the special masters appointed by federal courts. 175 In Tucker I, the IRS conceded that the fulltime, indefinitely employed positions of settlement officer, appeals officer, and appeals team manager are "continuing." 176 iii. Significant Authority A position must be vested with "significant authority" in order to constitute an Office. 177 Quoting the keystone of Appointments Clause jurisprudence, Buckley v. Valeo, the courts have repeatedly held that "any appointee exercising significant authority . . . is an 'Officer of the United States,' and must, therefore, be appointed . . . ."
178 It should also be noted that "Freytag calls on us to consider all the powers of the officials in question in evaluating whether their authority is 'significant,' not just those applied to the litigant bringing the challenge."
179 Stated otherwise, an Officer for one purpose is an Officer for all purposes.
In Tucker I, the Tax Court echoed virtually all past courts and cases in saying " [t] he Supreme Court has yet to fully define the term 'significant authority'; and 'ascertaining the test's real meaning requires a look at the roles of the employees whose status was at issue in other cases. '" 180 In that 174 In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court weighed the fact that the position of "independent counsel" had "no time limit" against the fact that it "is appointed essentially to accomplish a single task, and when that task is over the office is terminated." 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988). It ultimately concluded that "these factors relating to the 'ideas of tenure, duration . . . and duties' of the independent counsel," Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511, "are sufficient to establish that appellant is an 'inferior' officer in the constitutional sense." Id.
175 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881 ("[T]he duties, salary, and means of appointment for [special trial judges of the Tax Court] are specified by statute . . . . These characteristics distinguish special trial judges from special masters, who are hired by Article III courts on a temporary, episodic basis, whose positions are not established by law, and whose duties and functions are not delineated in a statute.") 176 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 160. Specifically, the D.C. Circuit stated that "the main criteria for drawing the line between inferior Officers and employees not covered by the clause are (1) the significance of the matters resolved by the officials, (2) the discretion they exercise in reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of those decisions."
188 No modern case law states that significant authority is possible without significance or discretion. 189 However, some dicta from the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit suggest that final decision-making authority is not always necessary for a finding of significant authority.
190
In Freytag, the Supreme Court suggested that significant enough "duties and discretion" might outweigh the lack of authority to enter a final decision.
191 However, the court went on to say that irrespective of that 188 Id.
189 Although the OLC Memo concedes that "Buckley is sometimes read to hold that persons who [lack discretion] cannot themselves be considered officers" it nonetheless insists that "'independent discretion' is not a necessary attribute of delegated sovereign authority." Officers of the U.S., 2007 OLC LEXIS 3* at *53-54. 190 In addition to the cases that follow, Courts and commentators occasionally cite Edmonds for the proposition that "final decision-making authority" is not essential to "significant authority" or the definition of Officer, but rather, draws the line between inferior and principal Officers. Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 1178; see supra note 189. This interpretation of Edmonds misreads the precedent as well as the statutory authority of the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which was considered in that case. Those judges, in fact, do have final decision-making authority. In some instances, their decisions are subject to a right of appeal to a higher court within the executive branch, namely, the D.C. Circuit for the Armed Forces. However, a right of appeal can hardly be said to negate finality. 200 Only in cases like Freytag, where the Supreme Court found all three criteria for significant authority, are the positions at issue held to be Offices. Although the courts occasionally indicate that final decision-making authority is unnecessary, none of them have actually found significant authority absent the power to make final decisions. 201 Given that fact, this Article submits that each of the three "main criteria" is a necessary element of significant authority in all or most cases.
a. Significant or Important Power
One of the three "main criteria" for "significant authority" is power over significant matters. 202 A matter is significant if it is "substantively significant," meaning that it is important, real, or meaningful in nature.
203
Although Tucker II was light on reasoning in this respect, the requirement of "significance" appears to derive directly from the term "significant authority" and Buckley v. Valeo. If a position must be imbued with "significant authority" to constitute an Office, then it logically follows that a position vested only with insignificant authority cannot constitute an Office. Beyond logic, pragmatism requires significance. It would be a waste of time and resources to subject the selection of truly insignificant posts to the rigors of the Appointments Clause. For example, every year, the U.S. House of Representatives co-sponsors "a nationwide high school visual art competition" with the Congressional Institute.
204 "Students submit entries to their representative's office, and panels of district artists select the winning entries . . . . The winning works are displayed for one year at the U.S. Capitol." 205 Even making the unrealistic assumption that these "district artists" meet the other requirements of the Appointments Clause, it would be absurd to hold that they are Officers. The subject matter of judging a high school art competition is simply not significant or important enough to justify appointment by the President, Courts of Law, or Heads of Departments.
In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit assumed "that the issue of a person's tax liability is substantively significant" given the Supreme Court's previous decision in Freytag that special trial judges' power over tax liability constitutes "significant authority." 206 
b. Discretion
One of the three "main criteria" for "significant authority" is "discretion." 207 A position is vested with discretion when the tasks of its holder are "more than ministerial." 208 Stated in the opposite, a position lacks discretion if its tasks "allowed the holder no choice . . . even though the consequences of his ministerial decisions were both vital and final." 209 For example, a federal executioner has no discretion. The executioner has power over significant matters-quite literally, life and death. The executioner has final decision-making authority-there is no appeal after she pulls the switch. 210 However, the executioner has no discretion. The justice system tells her to execute or not, and thus, she lacks "significant authority" and is not an Officer. 213 Moreover, in Freytag, the Supreme Court explicitly held that "special trial judges exercise significant discretion" in finding them Officers. 214 Thus, neither the concept, nor the term of discretion was invented by the D.C. Circuit in Tucker II. 215 Instead, it drew the term and its meaning in the context of the Appointments Clause directly from Freytag. 216 Both "discretion" and "final decision-making authority" are aspects of "independent authority" in Freytag, and ultimately, the power to act "free from day-to-day supervision" in Buckley v. Valeo.
217
In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit held that IRS hearing officers lacked discretion, and hence, lacked significant authority. 218 It reached that conclusion because that position is "subject to consultation requirements, to guidelines, and to supervision" with respect to all decisions. 219 To summarize the court's reasoning, any issues that come before an IRS hearing officer are resolved without her discretion by reference to the Internal Revenue Manual, published IRS guidance, Treasury regulations, or directions from the IRS Office of Chief Counsel and other higher-ups in the Treasury Department. 220 Like the executioner, the IRS hearing officer has with Tucker I that a final decision is the "last word" within the agency or court in question.
225
A position is vested with final decision-making authority when its holder "has the final say within the agency" or court. 226 In case after case, the courts have analyzed finality under the Appointments Clause in terms of the last word for the agency or court. In Freytag, the U.S. Supreme Court held that special trial judges possess "final decision-making authority" because they are authorized to make the "final decision of the Tax Court" in declaratory judgment proceedings and limited-amount tax cases. 227 In Landry v. FDIC, the D.C. Circuit held that ALJs lack final decision-making authority because each and every one of their cases is subject to de novo review by the FDIC Board, and thus, they "can never render the decision of the FDIC."
228 In Tucker I, the Tax Court held that IRS hearing officers lack final decision-making authority because they lack "the power to make final decisions for the IRS." 229 In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit reversed the Tax Court to hold that IRS hearing officers possess final decision-making authority because they have the power to make final "decisions within the executive branch." 230 In one very strong sense, equating finality with actions that trigger judicial review is attractive. That standard draws a bright line. If the decision is appealable to court, then it is final. However, outside of the 225 See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 162-65. 226 Id. (framing the issue in Tucker I as whether the positions at issue "possess the power to make final decisions for the IRS"). 227 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 877-82. 228 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133-34. 229 See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 162-65. In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit held the opposite. Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134. IRS hearing officers have final decision-making authority because they have the power to make final "decisions within the executive branch." Id. 230 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134. If anything, the D.C. Circuit stated a higher standard for finality than the Tax Court by defining finality with respect to the entire executive branch rather than one agency. Id. However, it is doubtful that the D.C. Circuit meant to propound a new rule that finality requires finality within an entire branch of government. See id. In that extreme case, one could argue that only Supreme Court decisions are final within the judicial branch. See id. However, the court offered no explanation for its conclusion that IRS hearing officers possess final decision-making authority so one is largely left to guess at its reasoning. Id. court may, quite rationally, be reluctant to upset centuries of practice or throw entire government agencies into chaos. 237 Rational or otherwise, there is a heavy preference for the status quo in Appointments Clause cases, including the Tucker decisions. Findings of violations are few and far between. Although the Tax Court and D.C. Circuit disagreed on why, both of the Tucker decisions held that IRS hearing officers are mere employees and found no constitutional problem. 238 Moreover, where violations are found, they are typically attributable to recent laws. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court struck down a statute passed only a few years earlier and returned election law to the status quo. 239 In the case of the infamous "Duffy Defect," Congress amended a law that was only in place for a little over eight years and returned the power to appoint administrative patent judges to the Secretary of Commerce, who held that power before the offending law was passed. Whether a violation is found or not, Appointments Clause cases tend to reinforce the status quo.
The Tucker decisions provide an objective legal framework to evaluate Appointments Clause cases. However, that framework is the construct of many moving parts and definitions, each of which is subject to some level of interpretation. The precise definitions of significance, discretion, and final decision-making authority are still debatable. In close cases, there is ample room for subjective or qualitative biases to play a role. To successfully predict outcomes, one must be cognizant of the thumb on the scale for the status quo.
V. CONCLUSION
For the first time, the federal courts have outlined a comprehensive legal framework to define "Officers of the United States" under the Appointments Clause. Under Tucker I, an Officer holds a position that is (1) "established by Law," (2) "continuing," and (3) vested with "significant 237 In all likelihood, the pragmatic concern for efficient and effective government operations is the main driver for preferring the status quo in Appointments Clause cases. Patently ridiculous or extremely inconvenient legal outcomes are often ignored using the old rationale that "[t]he Constitution is not a suicide pact." 238 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1135; Tucker, 135 T.C. at 165-66. V o l . 1 1 2 0 1 4 | A p p o i n t m e n t s C l a u s e | 2 3 9 Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2014.26 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu authority." Under Tucker II, "significant authority" consists of three "main criteria": (1) power over "significant" or important matters, (2) "discretion," and (3) "final" decision-making authority. This Article adds the observation that each of the three criteria is a necessary element of significant authority in all or most cases.
The Tucker tests provide an objective paradigm for deciding and predicting the outcome of Appointments Clause cases. However, that paradigm has a lot of moving parts, each of which is subject to interpretation. In close cases, where more than one interpretation is possible, it is critical to understand that courts have a heavy preference for the status quo. Perhaps that preference is due to status quo bias or a rational desire to avoid upsetting the federal applecart. Either way, litigants and commentators repeatedly admonish the courts to apply the Appointments Clause more vigorously. In particular, the Tucker decisions are criticized for threatening the political accountability of positions in the IRS, and ultimately, the separation of powers. 240 However, courts should be very wary of overusing the Appointments Clause. If every single ALJ, low-level IRS bureaucrat, and countless equivalent positions in the federal government are held to constitute Offices which require appointment, the end result is all too predictable. The President, Courts of Law, and Heads of Departments will happily fire up their autopens and appoint every single position in the federal government. In the case of low-level positions, nothing is gained. Regardless of their status under the Appointments Clause, the Secretary of the Treasury will never personally interview IRS hearing officers. Each one will receive a certificate of appointment suitable for framing, but otherwise, their selection process remains the same. This charade would be useless, but not without cost. Higher-level positions, like special trial judge, independent counsel, or assistant attorney general, are liable to be lost in the shuffle of thousands or even millions of meaningless appointments. Ironically enough, overzealous application of the Appointments Clause is just as dangerous as
